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Deborah A. Melle submits this reply brief in support of her 
cross-appeal. 
POINT I 
MS. MELLE HAS MET THE MARSHALING REQUIREMENT 
As a preliminary objection to every point raised in 
Ms. Melle's cross-appeal, Dr. Bova perfunctorily claims Ms. Melle 
has failed to marshal the evidence. She has met the marshaling 
requirement with respect to each argument in her cross-appeal. 
Ms. Melle's first argument on cross-appeal, that the trial 
court improperly failed to include income from Dr. Bova's second 
job in computing alimony and child support awards, does not chal-
lenge a factual finding of the trial court. Rather, she challenges 
the legal reasoning employed by the trial court in refusing to add 
income from Dr. Bova's second job in determining his "gross 
income." Two factual findings, neither of which she contests, are 
relevant to her argument, the first being that Dr. Bova 
as an independent contractor, reviews medical case files 
for the Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah. In said 
capacity, the Defendant works approximately four hours 
per week1 and charges $125.00 per hour. 
(R. 1637). 
xThe trial court made a typographical error. It should read 
"the Defendant works approximately eight hours per month and 
charges $125.00 per hour." 
1 
Second, the trial court found that Dr. Bova's adjusted gross 
monthly income in 1994 from the Spine Center was $9,583.00. 
(R. 163 8). In determining to ignore income earned from the 
Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah in computing Dr. Bova's alimony 
and child support obligations, the trial court drew the legal 
conclusion that only income prior to the filing of this action in 
August 1994 was relevant. (R. 1638). Ms. Melle contests a legal 
conclusion, not a factual finding, in arguing that income earned 
while the parties were still married but after the divorce action 
was filed must also be considered. 
Ms. Melle's second argument on cross-appeal, that the trial 
court erred in making her pay a portion of the tax burden for the 
-IRA funds Dr. Bova improperly withdrew, similarly challenges a 
legal conclusion of the trial court. Ms. Melle's argument is that 
accepting the trial court's factual findings in support of its 
ruling as true, it is still unfair to force her to bear a tax 
burden incurred solely because of Dr. Bova's improper withdrawal of 
IRA funds. 
Ms. Melle's third argument on cross-appeal is that the trial 
court should have extrapolated beyond the Base Combined Child 
Support Obligation Table set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.14 
in determining Dr. Bova's child support obligation. In setting 
2 
child support at $1,400.00 per month, which is the child support 
award the Table shows should be set for a combined gross monthly 
income of $10,100.00, the trial court relied on the facts that 
Ms. Melle's gross monthly income was $2,386.00 and that Dr. Bova's 
was $9,583.00. (R. 1638). Although this combined monthly income 
exceeds the maximum income level shown in the Table, the trial 
court declined Ms. Melle's request to extrapolate beyond the Table 
and set child support higher than $1,400.00 per month. The trial 
court offered no factual findings for why it was refusing her 
request, and Ms. Melle is not required to guess what the factual 
basis might have been. If the trial court does ' not offer any 
insight into the evidentiary basis for its decision, it is impos-
sible to marshal the evidence. Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635 
(Utah App. 1995); Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 
1991). 
The fourth argument on cross-appeal is that the trial court 
should have granted her motion for new trial based on newly 
discovered evidence that Dr. Bova dissipated marital assets. 
Ms. Melle disputes the trial court's factual finding that she could 
have discovered the evidence before trial. (R. 1855). The trial 
court provided no subsidiary facts supporting this finding, but 
simply stated in conclusory fashion in its order denying her motion 
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that she could have discovered the evidence beforehand. (R. 1855) . 
Marshaling the evidence does not require pure guesswork; Ms. Melle 
does not know why the trial court felt she could have discovered 
the evidence before trial because Judge Noel did not explain why. 
See Campbell and Woodward. supra. 
Ms. Melle's last point on cross-appeal is not an argument, but 
a request for relief. She asks for attorney fees on appeal based 
on the law that when a party receives attorney fees in a divorce 
case at the trial court and that party prevails on appeal, attorney 
fees on appeal are warranted. Dr. Bova chides Ms. Melle for not 
marshaling the evidence on this request for relief, but she is not 
disputing a factual finding in making this request. 
This Court should disregard Dr. Bova's claim that Ms. Melle 
has not marshaled the evidence and focus on the merits of 
Ms. Melle's cross-appeal. Her arguments on cross-appeal largely 
challenge the trial court's legal conclusions, and in the few 
instances where she disputes factual findings, the trial court did 
not reveal the basis for those findings, making marshaling 
impossible. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
TO INCLUDE INCOME FROM DR. BOVA'S SECOND JOB 
IN COMPUTING ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT. 
Dr. Bova has repeatedly protested an increase in alimony or 
child support payments based on his alleged inability to afford an 
increase, as opposed to protesting on the basis of his ex-wife's 
and children's lack of need. He has thus made his entire income, 
including that earned from his second job, an issue. 
Dr. Bova began earning $125,000.00 per year as a physician 
with the Spine Center in 1991. (R. 2264-2267). In 1993, he 
entered a new contract with the Spine Center that allowed him the 
potential to earn more money.2 (R. 2268, 2281). Dr. Bova points 
out in his Reply Brief that during the winter of 1992-1993 he also 
took on a second job, earning $800.00 and ski discounts as a ski 
instructor. (R. 2258, 2494). In 1995, after Ms. Melle filed for 
divorce, he took on a different second job reviewing files for the 
Utah Worker's Compensation Fund. (R. 2299). The trial court found 
2For example, Dr. Bova earned gross income of $11,586.64 in 
January 1994; $16,282.28 in February 1994; $10,178.83 in March 
1994; $11,309.26 in April 1994; $10,755.06 in May 1994; $10,800.93 
in June 1994; and $15,300.48 in July 1994. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
19; R. 2291). 
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that Dr. Bova earns $1000.00 monthly from this second job.3 
(R. 1637). 
Ms. Melle urged the trial court to consider income from this 
second job in computing child support and alimony, but the trial 
court declined to do so on the basis that only the income he earned 
prior to the filing of this action, albeit still during the 
parties' marriage, was relevant. However, income from a second job 
must be considered if it was a source of income during the parties' 
marriage. Breinholt v. Breinholt. 905 P.2d 877 (Utah App. 1995). 
It is undisputed that the parties were still married in 1995. The 
income Dr. Bova earned in 1995 from the Utah Worker's Compensation 
Fund is therefore relevant to computing child support and alimony 
obligations. The trial court disregarded established Utah case law 
in deciding to compute child support and alimony based on income 
earned at the time the divorce action was filed. 
Dr. Bova contends that even if the trial court used income 
earned during the marriage as the benchmark for determining alimony 
3Dr. Bova attempts to downplay his second job by claiming that 
there was only one month that he earned $1,000.00 reviewing files. 
(Reply Brief of Appellant, p. 13, n.8). The trial court found 
otherwise, however, noting that the second job provided a regular 
stream of $1,000.00 extra in monthly income. (R. 1637). Dr. Bova 
testified that he has put in two hours per week at this second job 
and has charged $125.00 per hour since the spring of 1994. (R. 
2299-2301.) 
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and child support, it still would have had to ignore the income 
earned from his second job in determining child support because he 
worked more than forty hours weekly at the Spine Center. This 
argument is unavailing; while Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(2) states 
that courts typically should consider income earned from the 
equivalent of one forty-hour-per-week job in setting child support, 
it also provides that income earned in excess of this may be con-
sidered if the payor ''normally and consistently" works more than 
forty hours per week. With regard to alimony, extra income from 
overtime or a second job has always been viewed as relevant to 
setting alimony awards. See Crompton v. Crompton, 888 P. 2d 686 
(Utah App. 1994) (husband's history of working overtime during 
marriage justified higher alimony award). This was the case with 
Dr. Bova. 
Dr. Bova suggests, without any citation to the record, that he 
was forced to find a second job at the Worker's Compensation Fund 
because that was the only way he could pay his temporary child 
support and alimony obligations.4 (Reply Brief of Appellant, p. 
13). Nonetheless, working more than forty hours per week, whether 
it was through a second job or from working long hours at his job 
4This suggestion is suspicious in view of the fact that Dr. 
Bova was able to afford several vacations for himself during this 
period of alleged indigence. (R. 1499-1500). 
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with the Spine Center, was normal for Dr. Bova during the marriage. 
He had a second job as a ski instructor in the winter of 1992-1993. 
In addition to the twenty-six hours per week he spent seeing 
patients at the Spine Center, he also testified that he logged 
several hours weekly dictating notes from these visits and 
"studying and reading and research." (R. 2295). Furthermore, he 
testified that he acts as an expert witness in lawsuits and charges 
$450-$500 per hour, which earnings apparently go to the Spine 
Center. (R. 2296-2298). If his testimony that the hours he spent 
on non-clinical work at the Spine Center actually made this 
employment a forty-hour-plus job is to be believed, he established 
a practice of working more than forty hours per week long before 
the parties separated. Beginning in August 1991, when he commenced 
employment with the Spine Center, he worked there five days a week, 
eleven to twelve hours per day. (R. 1904-05) . 
The trial court incorrectly refused to take into account 
income earned from Dr. Bova's second job in setting alimony on the 
basis that only income earned at the time of filing the divorce 
action is relevant. Utah law is clear that all income earned 
during the parties' marriage, whether they are separated or not, or 
whether a divorce action has been filed or not, must be included in 
setting alimony. 
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The trial court also should have considered income from 
Dr. Bova's second job in determining child support. Even if he 
worked in excess of forty hours weekly with the two jobs, he 
historically worked that much during the marriage, and the children 
are entitled to the financial benefit of those excess hours. 
POINT III 
MS. MELLE SHOULD NOT SHARE THE TAX 
BURDEN OF DR. BOVA'S IMPROPER WITHDRAWAL OF 
IRA FUNDS WHEN HE DEPRIVED HER OF ANY INPUT AS 
TO WHEN THE FUNDS WERE WITHDRAWN. 
Although Ms. Melle had already filed her 1994 state and 
federal income tax returns at the time of trial, the court ordered 
the parties to file a joint tax return for 1994 and to share the 
tax liability of $16,000.00. The trial court found that ua 
substantial portion" of the tax liability was attributable to 
Dr. Bova's withdrawal of IRA funds in violation of the court's 
prior order. (R. 1642). While it was proper for the trial court 
to order a joint return on the ground that the overall tax 
liability would be less, it was improper for the court to require 
Ms. Melle to pay the portion of the tax liability incurred due to 
Dr. Bova's illegal withdrawal of IRA funds. 
There is no evidence that Ms. Melle benefited from any of the 
funds Dr. Bova illegally withdrew. Dr. Bova maintains he used 
$22,960.00 of the proceeds to pay state and federal taxes to the 
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benefit of both parties, yet he was unable to produce documentation 
proving this. Furthermore, Ms. Melle had no say in when the funds 
were withdrawn. Had Dr. Bova not withdrawn the funds in violation 
of the court's order but instead waited until both parties agreed 
upon an optimal time for withdrawal, Ms. Melle could have agreed to 
withdrawal at a time when she was in a better financial position to 
share any tax liability incurred from a future withdrawal. 
Dr. Bova deprived her of this opportunity, and the trial court 
disregarded this in requiring her to pay half of the tax liability 
incurred due to his illegal withdrawal. 
POINT IV 
CHILD SUPPORT SHOULD BE SET BY 
EXTRAPOLATING BEYOND THE CHILD SUPPORT TABLE. 
The highest level of combined monthly income shown on the Base 
Combined Child Support Obligation Table ("the Table") is 
$10,100.00. The corresponding child support amount for two 
children is $1,400.00. The fact that the Table stops at these 
figures does not mean that $1,4 00.00 is the maximum amount of child 
support available for two children. Rather, courts are permitted 
to extrapolate beyond these figures if parents earn more than 
$10,100.00 combined adjusted gross monthly income to reflect the 
actual income earned by the parents. 
10 
The support for the parties' children should not artificially 
be limited at $1,400.00 when the combined adjusted gross monthly 
income is $1,869.00 higher than what is shown in the Table. The 
trial court offered no reason for why it was depriving the children 
of child support based on their parents' actual income, despite 
Ms. Melle's urging that the children maintain as similar a standard 
of living as they enjoyed when their parents were married. 
Dr. Bova contends that the children should not receive more child 
support because he has more visitation than what is provided in the 
standard visitation schedule, but he forgets his stipulation that 
"irrespective of the amount of the days per month that the defen-
dant has the children for visitation that he would pay child 
support pursuant to the sole custody worksheet," which worksheet 
requires reference to the Table. (R. 1638). 
There is no reason to deprive the children of the maximum 
level of child support allowed by law. The children are entitled 
to as similar a financial lifestyle as they had during the mar-
riage, and increasing the child support amount by extrapolation 
will achieve this result. 
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POINT V 
MS. MELLE'S MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER MARITAL 
MONIES WERE IMPROPERLY DEPOSITED 
INTO THE TRUST ACCOUNT SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN GRANTED. 
Dr. Bova faults Ms. Melle for failing to discover before trial 
that he had deposited a large sum money into his daughter's trust 
account right before the parties separated. Nonetheless, he is the 
very reason she failed to discover this information -- she asked 
him during the discovery process to list all accounts in his name, 
and he did not list the trust account for his daughter in his name. 
Having breached his duty to disclose requested information, he 
cannot now claim that she should have found what he prevented her 
from finding. 
It is undisputed that Ms. Melle asked Dr. Bova through pre-
trial discovery requests to list all accounts in his name. It is 
undisputed that he failed to list a trust account he set up for his 
daughter, along with two trust accounts set up for the children 
born of the marriage. She learned of the existence of these trust 
accounts two weeks before trial, when Dr. Bova gave her a three-
page document she would later introduce at trial as Exhibit P-9. 
(R. 2173-74). This document contained a balance for each of the 
three accounts as of October 7, 1995, but contained no information 
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as to when money had been deposited into these accounts. She only 
discovered information regarding the timing of deposits after 
trial, when she was cleaning out his desk and found a document that 
he had kept from her showing a balance of approximately $3,000.00 
just prior to the parties' separation. The balance at the time of 
trial was $16,000.00, suggesting that Dr. Bova improperly diverted 
almost $13,000.00 into the account after the parties separated. 
Ms. Melle diligently attempted to discover the existence of any 
account Dr. Bova might have opened for his daughter when she asked 
in pre-trial discovery for all accounts in his name. His 
obstreperous failure to list the daughter's account prevented her 
from learning of its existence until just before trial, and 
therefore prevented her from inquiring about when any deposits were 
made in~o that account. The trial court's denial of her motion for 
a new trial on the issue of whether the $13,000.00 deposit was 
improper and penalized her for his deceptive behavior. 
CONCLUSION 
The child support and alimony awards set by the trial court 
should be adjusted upward to reflect income earned from Dr. Bova's 
second job and the parties' actual income. Additionally, Ms. Melle 
should not be required to bear a tax burden that Dr. Bova created 
in violation of the trial court's order. A new trial should be 
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granted on the issue of whether Dr. Bova improperly deposited 
marital monies into his daughter's trust account. Finally, 
Ms. Melle should be awarded attorney fees if she prevails on 
appeal. 
DATED this / / day of November, 1997. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
u&— P iV^y 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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